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1. Introduction
D. H. Lawrence’s last work, Apocalypse (1931), is a critical treatise on St. 
John’s Book of Revelation. In it, Lawrence reveals the deception inherent in 
Christianity: how the Christian idea of eternal life at the hereafter rules over and 
suffocates earthly life; how the idea of the judgment of God at the end-time de-
rives from weak people’s 1) “ressentiment”, or sentiment of vengeance; and how 
the selfless love of Jesus is replaced with an earthly power in the form of organ-
ized religion. In the time of Revelation, the Jews were forced to live in exile, una-
ble to win this earthly power. They were persecuted and bullied wherever they 
went, forced to become the poor underdogs. The only hope of salvation for them 
was in the belief that their destiny was “postponed,” and that their lives would 
blossom in the hereafter, not on the earth, after God had made his descent. They 
would then be given eternal life at the hereafter, and their enemies would face 
the wrath of God. In this way, the revelation that John receives is that of the ulti-
mate victory of good over evil, from a perspective distorted by ressentiment, and 
the end of the present age.
Christianity inherits this Judaic idea of a “chosen people.” Lawrence de-
scribes this sentiment: “they took over the Jewish idea of ultimate triumph and 
reign of the chosen people. From being bottom dogs they were going to be top 
dogs: in Heaven” (Apocalypse, 63). Lawrence condemns the Book of Revelation as 
“the revelation of the undying will-to-power in man, and its sanctification, its fi-
nal triumph” (67).
Lawrence extends this condemnation to “the negative power of the mass” 
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(70) in his contemporary society. “In Russia, the triumph over worldly power 
was accomplished, and the reign of saints set in, with Lenin for the chief saint,” 
he writes (70). Lawrence was right to connect the problem of religious belief to 
that of politics: the problem of love and power.
He is convinced that the reason Christianity was transformed into a “reli-
gion of power” can be detected first in what is called a “religion of love.” Accord-
ing to Lawrence, Christianity was transformed when an ancient and universal 
web of symbols, which expressed the productive connection between man and 
the cosmos, was replaced with a system of allegory, which represented the one 
and only interpretation of the Word of God. Love between the cosmos and peo-
ple was transformed into love for God, understood as a contract between God 
and a “chosen people.” Since then, a system of allegory has dominated European 
religious narratives and the submission of love for God has exercised coercive 
force, like the supreme extension of power, through this rhetorical device. In this 
way, Lawrence’s condemnation is not limited to the sphere of religion. In this 
book, he also links his accusation to the fact that a system of allegorical interpre-
tation provides a foundation for political thought in Europe, causing the break-
down of its civilization. Here emerges the problem of politics and language.
This paper aims to investigate Lawrence’s criticism of Apocalyptic thought 
through a consideration of his linguistic views, rather than through a reading of 
his political thought. There are several reasons why I adopted this linguistic view-
point. First, if we take a stance that views signification as a collective process, we 
can not only consider the contents of political messages but also understand its 
rhetoric as political. Rhetoric is that which gives society a shape and constitutes 
our political vision. From this perspective, the relation between politics and lan-
guage is foregrounded. Secondly, we ask how allegorical thinking relates to poli-
tics in our present day and age, with its apocalyptic implications. Conversely, we 
can also ask how the symbolic thinking of ancient times, which Lawrence advo-
cates, provides us not only with a method for revising politics and but also with 
an alternative way of approaching the problem of “the modern apocalypse.”
2. Political Implication of Mythmaking
Lawrence’s accusation against the Book of Revelation begins by observing 
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that the text is a composite of layerings: on the top layer lies Christian thought 
with orthodox explanatory remarks, which is piled on the layer of Jewish escha-
tological thought, and at the bottom there is a layer of ancient pagan thought 
with its proper cosmic view. According to T. R. Wright, the many commentaries 
read by Lawrence on the Book of Revelation corroborate Lawrence’s belief in its 
intertextuality (228). In a book published in 1920, R.H. Charles, Archdeacon of 
Westminster, states that “since Ephesus, an ancient Greek city in Turkey of today, 
was a hot bed of every cult and superstition, it is not surprising that John [?] 
should have incorporated elements not only from Jewish apocalyptic texts but 
from obscure pagan texts as well” (230).
John encountered ancient eastern symbols in Ephesus, and added Jewish 
meanings to them as a way of fully exploiting them in his apocalyptic thought. 
In this way, the ancient symbol of life as an imaginative power was adapted for a 
new context: the Jewish allegory that centered on the judgment of God. Since 
then, the idea of the judgment of God has been reproduced so much that it has 
become a basic assumption of Christianity up to the present date.
According to Fredric Jameson, a system of allegorical interpretation calls 
for an Ur-narrative to absorb all other narratives. In this system, “the data of one 
narrative line are radically impoverished by their rewriting according to the par-
adigm of another narrative” (22). The political implications of a system of alle-
gorical interpretation are here demonstrated. Similarly, the ancient myth of a vi-
tal consciousness was appropriated and transformed into ideology in order to 
serve the pursuit of an apocalyptic utopia by the Jews. Here we can clearly see 
the political implications of mythmaking.
Lawrence condemns this transformation, saying that it is the revelation of 
the power in man, but his condemnation is not directed entirely toward the doc-
trine found in the book, but rather towards the rhetorical device by which it is 
represented. The point here is the problem of allegory and symbol, rather than 
that of the theory itself. His criticism aims at disclosing how a system of allegori-
cal interpretation functions through the Book of Revelation in order to serve 
Jewish ressentiment.
As discussed above, when the Jewish people appropriated the ancient sym-
bols into their doctrine of the judgment of God, they eliminated the possibility 
of a variety of interpretations, to which the ancient symbols were open. The pos-
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sibilities for the symbols in the imagination were rich. The crucial point here is 
the affirmation of imagination that makes possible a variety of interpretations. 
Lawrence describes this in the preface to e Dragon of the Apocalypse (1930), 
by Frederick Carter, as follows:
We do not care, vitally, about theories of the Apocalypse: what the Apoca-
lypse means. What we care about is the release of the imagination. A real 
release of the imagination renews our strength and our vitality, makes us 
feel stronger and happier?. (294)
The imagination is considered an entrance to another, more vital and imper-
sonal world. To the pagan, the cosmos outspreads beyond “our petty little love of 
nature” (Apocalypse 76). It is filled with a wild vitality, or rather it is dynamics it-
self, not staying in the same place even for a moment. It defies all explanation, so 
the pagan people represented the cosmos using images or symbols. “Symbols 
mean something: yet they mean something different to every man. Fix the mean-
ing of a symbol, and you have fallen into the commonplace of allegory,” Lawrence 
writes (101). In other words, symbols have semantic polysemy, and are therefore 
open to a variety of interpretations. They are a resource of the imagination.
John of Patmos, however, transformed the essence of their cosmic view by 
replacing the multivocality of symbols with a Jewish univocality, that is, allegory. 
Symbols, which were the treasury of the unexhausted meanings that resist expla-
nation, were replaced with allegory, which “can always be explained: and ex-
plained away” (142). The ancient symbols’ multivocality enabled us to find “an-
other meaning, another level of meaning” (60), but orthodox Jews did not need 
another level of meaning. They needed a narrative that provided their side with 
a univocal justice. As a result, the meaning of the Book of Revelation is fixed by 
allegory. It has no life for us anymore, because life loses its power through expla-
nation.
Rereading the Book of Revelation as a book that realizes the release of the 
imagination denotes digging down past the layer of “closed interpretation,” into 
another more vital world. During this attempt, the oppositions between allegory 
and symbol, explanation and imagination, the only world and the possibility of 
other worlds are in focus. The formers of each pair are based on a black-and-
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white view of the world, and the only correct explanation of the world would be 
given by referring all other narratives to the one and only Ur-narrative. They 
open the door to the dictatorship. In this way, these oppositions are connected 
to political conflict.
3. The Two Aspects of Organism
Why is a web of symbols, a source of the imagination in ancient times, 
transformed into a system of allegory that seeks one correct explanation? In or-
der to examine this problem more closely, let us consider Lawrence’s criticism of 
Christianity by considering the two aspects of the word “organism,” which usu-
ally correspond to “life.” Contemporary philosopher Gilles Deleuze refers to the 
word “organism” in his essay as “the judgment of God”:
[J]udgment implies a veritable organization of the bodies through which it 
acts: organs are both judges and judged, and the judgment of God is noth-
ing other than the power to organize to infinity. Whence the relationship 
between judgment and the sense organs. (“To Have Done,” 130)
A system of organs, or an organism, consists of various organs unified in a 
centralized system with a command central, which is exactly how the Christian 
God functions. In order to judge life in terms of transcendent values, the power 
of the transcendent entity, or God, who establishes the value system and forces 
us to obey it, must be assumed. In other words, God is a totalizing and organiz-
ing force, providing order by unifying many different fragmented elements. Each 
organism, or the body, is where this process of organization of organs is con-
ducted.
Lawrence’s criticism against Christianity is more specifically directed to-
ward organized religion. Presumably, Christ himself never intended to organize 
his message as such. Against his will, however, in organized Christianity, God is 
regarded as the model of totalizing power who provides the cosmos with a uni-
vocal meaning and moral. This is demonstrated in Lawrence’s descriptions of 
how the pagan symbol of the woman was transformed through the process of 
Christianization:
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Gone is the grand pagan calm which can see the woman of the cosmos 
wrapped in her warm gleam like the sun, and having her feet upon the 
moon, the moon who gives us our white flesh. Gone is the great Mother of 
the cosmos, crowned with diadem of the twelve great stars of zodiac. She is 
driven to the desert, and the dragon of the watery chaos spues floods upon 
her. (121)
The ancient Jews hated pagan gods, especially the great pagan goddess. The 
pagan goddess was suggestive of the great Mother, who stood in the days when 
matriarchy was still the natural order of the nations in the eastern Mediterrane-
an. She was the symbol of procreation and thus stood for sexual permissiveness. 
However, the Jewish establishment drove her into the desert, and after her flight, 
the great vision of the Scarlet Woman appeared. This image was borrowed from 
the pagans, but according to the Jewish interpretation she was the “Magna Mater 
in malefic aspect: the great whore of Babylon” (121). The Jews cursed her be-
cause, according to Lawrence, they envied what they were eager to but could not 
get. “The harlot sits magnificent with her golden cup of the wine of sensual 
pleasure in her hand. How the apocalyptists would have loved to drink out of 
her cup! And since they couldn’t, how they loved smashing it!” he writes (121).
Sex was venerated in ancient times, since ancient people affirmed our physi-
cal being as “unknown” (98) or, in other words, as a source of inexhaustible and 
impenetrable meaning. Once sex was regarded as an abomination by Judaism, 
the act of pursuing sensual pleasure came to be considered deviant. Through this 
conversion, an ancient symbol that affirmed life and sex was separated from the 
productive power of imagination. It is a key example, in which univocal Jewish 
morality drives out the ancient polysemic ethics of nature. This is also viewed as 
the work of weak people’s ressentiment, but what should be noted here is that 
Jewish doctrine rejects the innumerable possibilities of the body. This shows its 
tendency to be too heavily weighted by the allegorical way of thinking.
In this way, apocalyptic utopia, presupposing God as the judge, is constitut-
ed by denying deviation and by molding life into a fixed form. Along this line, a 
politics that seeks univocal justice emerges. These presuppositions, both in reli-
gion and politics, are directly derived from the first aspect of the “organism”: a 
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totalizing or organizing force.
4. The Semantic Polysemy of the Ancient Symbols
On the other hand, the ancient symbols are polysemic. This is because their 
wisdom is based on the belief that we are part of the living, incarnate cosmos, to 
which we have innumerable relations (149). This way of thinking is called emo-
tional thinking, and it is derived from an additional aspect of the “organism.”
At first, we have to remember that the ancient times mentioned by Law-
rence refer to the pre-Socratic societies. According to Daniel Schneider, Law-
rence was affected by the book Early Greek Philosophy (1892), by John Burnet. In 
the following passage, Lawrence describes the common vision of the cosmos 
during this age: “the religious system of the pagan world did what Christianity 
has never tried to do: they gave the true correspondence between the material 
cosmos and the human soul. The ancient cosmic theories were exact, and appar-
ently perfect. In them science and religion were in accord” (“The Two Princi-
ples,” 227).
This is the age in which magic was linked to wisdom and not distinguished 
from science. T. R. Wright refers to this as “earlier occult wisdom” (243). Law-
rence’s thought was influenced by the philosophy of nature of the pre-Socratic 
philosophers Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Empedocles. As Lawrence 
describes, “[to] the ancient consciousness, Matter, Materia, or Substantial things 
are God” (95), they are materialist as long as they see dynamic power or spirit in 
matter itself. This is the materialism of the days when natural science and reli-
gion were linked together. To them, God is the cosmos that is newly created each 
time there is a change in the combination of its elements. Whatever it might be 
called, religion, magic, or occult, this knowledge of the cosmos is quite similar to 
modern science. They knew that matter alternately repeats its connection with, 
and disconnection from, any other matter. In other words, matter escapes from 
its current form and sets out for other new forms. They placed more importance 
on the productive forces of matter than on matter that had already been formed. 
Such forces of matter are the vitality, or organic power, of life. This implies an-
other aspect of the “organism,” different from the first one that refers to totality 
and organization.
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This aspect of the organism reflects the idea of hylozoism. As Donald Gut-
ierrez notes, “the term hylozoism refers to the archaic pre-Socratic conception 
that all matter is alive, or that life and matter are indivisible” (576). This is a phil-
osophical vision that ascribes immanent power to matter. Lawrence also de-
scribes this in Apocalypse, “A great rock is God. A pool of water is God. And why 
not? [?] I can touch it. It is undeniable. It is God” (95). For Lawrence, the word 
“God” signifies life. We can detect from this statement that, according to Law-
rence, even inorganic substances have life, so long as we can touch them. The 
distinction between organic and inorganic makes no sense for him, although he 
does not actually use the word “inorganic” in this sense.2)  When he uses the ex-
pression “organic relationship,” he also implies a relationship with inorganic sub-
stances. The word “organism,” or life, signifies a deeper meaning.3)
This vision emphasizes the physical interrelation between the cosmos and 
man. The materiality of the body acts in concert with the materiality of the cos-
mos, and produces variable connections. These connections are affected by irra-
tional and contingent impulses. As a result, they in turn produce open-ended re-
sponses. Life is constituted through these various relations and symbols express 
them.
Lawrence takes the symbol of the dragon as an example. The dragon is one 
of the oldest symbols of the human consciousness. It is the symbol of “a power 
or potency within him” (123). In other words, it symbolizes a great desire of any 
sort, ready to leap out in an instant. Lawrence describes this symbol as follows:
Primitive man, or shall we say early man was in a certain sense afraid of his 
own nature, it was so violent and unexpected inside him, always “doing 
things to him.” He early recognized the half-divine, half-demonish nature 
of this unexpected potency inside him. [?.] this is the dragon, the grand di-
vine dragon of his superhuman potency, or the great demonish dragon of 
his inward destruction. (123)
Here, we can see the coexistence of opposites, both the divine and demonic na-
ture of human potency. Sometimes it comes upon us like a glorious sensation or 
destructive urge. We consist of such opposites. Lawrence does not destroy this 
dichotomy immediately, instead he stresses that the struggles of paradoxical de-
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sires within us constitute our lives. It is this dragon that “surges in us to make us 
move, to make us act, to make us bring forth something” (124). A void would 
attack the life in us should we cease to struggle for existence.
Lawrence takes another symbol as an instance of this coexistence: the 
“twins.” He says:
[T]hey give the two alternate forms of elemental consciousness, our day-
consciousness and our night-consciousness, that which we are in the depth 
of night, and that other, very different being which we are in bright day. A 
creature of dual and jealous consciousness is man, and the twins witness 
jealously to the duality. [?] Now these little ones, these rivals, they are “wit-
nesses” to life, for it is between their opposition that the Tree of Life grows. 
(117)
The twins testify to dualism. “They make life possible, but they make life limit-
ed” (117), and at the same time they maintain a balance. Here too, the dichoto-
my will not be annihilated. Instead, it is shown that the existence of opposites 
depends upon both their conflict and balance.
The notion of tension or conflict between opposites should not be confused 
with that of war. Conflict is neither a cause for triumph nor annihilation, but in-
stead the starting point for a new formation of life. War means a triumph of one 
side and an annihilation of the other. It belongs to the world of allegorical inter-
pretation. On the contrary, ancient people believed that in the middle of two ex-
tremes, the cosmos, as are humans, is always transformed4) by the conflict be-
tween unexpected potencies. Therefore, only polysemic symbols can express the 
world as a kind of web, in which paradoxical elements fight against each other 
and find new dimensions of life. In each dimension, the symbols have different 
meanings. While allegory fixes the cosmos through a one-on-one correspond-
ence of images with real substances, symbols “may remain travelling in between 
positions,” as noted by Mary Bryden (109). In other words, ancient symbols re-
sist the totalitarian regime of images. In this sense, it can be said that symbols 
express life as a relation, the second aspect of the organism, denoting incessant 
self-transformation and shifting connections with the other. This can be linked 
to Lawrence’s expression “the living organic connections” (149), from the last 
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chapter of Apocalypse. In this way, Lawrence continues to examine, through the 
consideration of symbol and allegory, the opposition between the multivocality 
and the univocality of life.
5. The Politics of Symbolic Seeing
As we have argued above, the dichotomy of allegory and symbol is pro-
duced through two inclinations of what life is. They can be expressed as such: 
life as a form and life as a relation. The difference between these two inclinations 
can be also described as the comparison between emotional thinking of the an-
cient prophets dealing with living symbols and intellectual thinking of modern 
politicians dealing with abstraction. The emotional thought of the former can be 
detected in their dynamic decision making. It is described as follows:
The old oracles were not supposed to say something that fitted plainly in the 
whole chain of circumstance. They were supposed to deliver a set of images 
or symbols of the real dynamic value, which should set the emotional con-
sciousness of the enquirer, as he pondered them, revolving more and more 
rapidly, till out of a state of intense emotional absorption the resolve at last 
formed; or, as we say, the decision was arrived at. (93)
This is an emotionally intensive way of thinking, not accomplished through 
a logical chain, but instead through physical and emotional, even irrational, 
awareness. The imagination revolves around a whirlpool and from its depth the 
decision is spontaneously made. The prophet, or the seer, knew what to do in re-
sponse to the intensity of the symbols. This means of prophesizing can be called 
“symbolic seeing,” to borrow Mara Kalnins’s words (637). For comparison, she 
aligns it again with the influence of Heraclitus (638).
This is also a rotational thought, the repetition of which implies dynamism 
and constitutes what is called “a cycle of time,” which is quite different from our 
idea of time as a continuity in an eternal straight line. Under the supremacy of 
the mental consciousness, “we always want a ‘conclusion’, an end, we always want 
to come, in our mental process, to a decision, a finality, a full-stop” (93). Law-
rence emphasizes that there is no goal.
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Moreover, the pagan way of thought allows for a complete change in state of 
mind, “The old method of the Apocalypse is to set forth the image, make a 
world, and then suddenly depart from this world in a cycle of time and move-
ment and even, an epos; and then return again to a world not quite like the orig-
inal one, but on another level” (97). They create a world, then dissolve it to rec-
reate a new one. This process of ‘dissolution and recreation,” and concept of rota-
tional time, correspond directly to one of the characteristics of modernism 
pointed out by Frank Kermode (64). Images or symbols are connected to the 
logic of contingency, in more precise term, material contingency. They can be 
interpreted plurally according to the contingent encounter with other elements 
in other dimensions of life. In short, images and symbols have the power to rec-
reate the world that they are often thought to represent.
Lawrence delineates the difference between the pagan manner of thought 
and that of modern politics. The latter arrives at decision by staying within the 
guidelines of a predetermined program. It is an allegorical way of thinking. Of 
course, he definitively supports the former. He dares to say, “the fact that no pol-
itician today has the courage to follow this intensive method of ‘thought’ is the 
reason of the absolute paucity of the political mind today” (94). However, it is 
not probable that any politician today applies this intensive method, too accus-
tomed as we are to the rational way of thinking in the sphere of politics. We re-
ject political ambiguities, while having a wide range of interpretation is regarded 
as means of political deceit. Therefore, Lawrence’s tactics of indeterminacy are 
often misunderstood. Even in the sphere of literature, many commentators criti-
cize Lawrence as ambiguous: he correctly diagnoses the disease of civilization, 
but does not provide a solution. Likewise, he always finishes his novels without 
any concrete conclusion.
His embracing of indeterminacy can be explained by two facts. First, the 
emotional consciousness that he advocates resides in the body, and he calls our 
physical being, the body, as unknown, as the ancient people do. (98) We never 
know what we will happen to be. However, we also have abundant possibilities 
to become something. These possibilities are actualized through the struggles, 
not war, between opposites. Indeterminacy can be linked to possibilities.
Secondly, Lawrence must have sensed the recurrence of allegorical violence 
in his time. It is true that during his time, when optimism for the linear view of 
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historical development had rapidly diminished since World War One, political 
moods reflected this critical awareness and partially shifted towards the control 
of life. At the same time, opposing political movements also sought the one ideal 
solution. This tendency, in the end, would mean annihilation of difference and 
result in a war for total mastery. Lawrence disclosed this process and urged us to 
revise the ethical and political implications of allegorical interpretation, by em-
phasizing the polysemy of life. In this sense, it is possible to identify his endeavor 
as an analysis of the politics of the symbol.
6. Conclusion
In Apocalypse, Lawrence delineates two contradictory inclinations towards 
life, multiplicity, and totality, through the analysis of two rhetorical devices, the 
symbol and allegory. These two inclinations are two sides of the same coin. The 
direction of social formation is dependent upon the stronger of the two at any 
given moment.
In the last chapter of the book, Lawrence returns to the problem of individ-
uality and collectivity in modern society. He calls modern men, the mass, “frag-
ments which have no organic whole” (147). The expression “organic whole” sig-
nifies a state that is open to contingent relationships with the rest. This expres-
sion corresponds to the second aspect of life. If we apprehend life only through 
the first aspect of the organism, that of totality and organization, we risk misun-
derstanding Lawrence’s implications.
Although the organism, as an entity organized by a totalizing power, seems 
to represent a well-established self, it is in fact closed to outside relationships, es-
pecially physical relationships. It never fulfills a proper life. Lawrence calls this 
type of individual a fragment with only a collective whole. He is the standard-
ized “average man” (“Democracy” 63), having annihilated any uniqueness and 
becomes no more than a composite of society. On one hand, this type of men 
forms the society of mass democracy, and on the other hand, raises “the idea of 
Nation, or Internationalism, higher” (65) and is devoted to totalitarianism. Here, 
from the perspective of the two types of consciousness, Lawrence clearly dem-
onstrates the dangers of the mentality of modern man and society. He says that 
if we want salvation from the modern predicament, we must return to the an-
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cient wisdom of the unregulated relationship with the other.
We can see the same kind of allegorical violence continue onward into to 
the present day without any sign of cessation. In the preface to the French edi-
tion of Apocalypse in 1978, Deleuze positions the USA’s desire for world domina-
tion on the same line as the sentiments of those who seek the judgment of God. 
He describes it in the following way:
The Apocalypse is not a concentration camp (Antichrist); it is the great mil-
itary, police, and civil security of the new State (the Heavenly Jerusalem). 
The modernity of the Apocalypse lies not in its predicted catastrophes, but 
in its programmed self-glorification, the institution of glory in the New Je-
rusalem, the demented installation of an ultimate judiciary and moral pow-
er. (“Nietzsche,” 46)
Moreover, a Japanese sociologist Mita Munesuke states in his post-9/11 
book that this social structure has not changed, though it has been inverted. He 
quotes from Lawrence’s Apocalypse and indicates that the ressentiment inherent 
in the Book of Revelation can be also be seen in the sentiments of Muslim ex-
tremists, who were compelled to launch suicide bombings against America in a 
world globalized by the ideal of “Pax Americana.” As these instances show, the 
problem of allegorical violence continues to persist even today.
However, it is true that we cannot draw up a blueprint of modern society, 
which is constituted by those individuals who live with a symbolic way of think-
ing. In this sense, Lawrence’s claim may sound like a utopian ideal, which does 
not go beyond a Romantic framework of liberating rhetoric. Nevertheless, Law-
rence’s rhetorical strategy is not the mere rediscovery of an ancient myth, but in-
stead the connection of symbols’ active power to creativity, through which an al-
ternative societal assemblage can be realized. This strategy is drawn from his 
conviction that all of the rational and coherent discourses have ultimately served 
the seizure of power. Of course, this criticism is applicable to his own writings, 
but it is true that his criticism of the Book of Revelation not only opens the path 
to a critical analysis of power, but also urges us to re-examine the relation of 
consciousness, language, and politics.
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[Notes]
1) In order to understand the term “weak people” more fully, we can make reference 
to the analysis of this notion in Gilles Deleuze’s commentary on Nietzsche. 
Deleuze notes that “what Nietzsche calls weak or slavish is not the least strong but 
that which, whatever its strength, is separated from what it can do” (Nietzsche and 
Philosophy 61). This definition can be associated with Lawrence’s distinction be-
tween he who has strength within himself to fulfill his own life and he who does 
not.
2) Lawrence employs the phrase “inorganic connections” (149) in the last chapter, in 
opposition to “organic connections.” Here he denotes, with the word “inorganic,” 
a dead connection, which “is composed of myriad dis-united fragments, each 
fragment assuming to itself a false wholeness, a false individuality” (147). It im-
plies a dead end. For Lawrence, democracy is one example.
3) Moreover, Deleuze uses the word “non-organic” in his essay“To Have Done With 
Judgment” in order to express the vitality of matter, contrary to the organism as 
the judgment of God. It should be interpreted as “not-organized” or not totalized 
by the central command. His famous notion of “the body without organs” can be 
associated with the second aspect of the organism we discuss here.
4) Of course the term “transformation” here should not be interpreted as the same as 
the Jewish modification in the Book of Revelation. The latter demonstrates the delib-
erate work of ressentiment, but the former shows the spontaneous process of nature.
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D. H. Lawrence and the Politics of the Symbol
Hiroko Mizuta
This paper aims to investigate Lawrence’s criticism of Apocalyptic thought by 
focusing on the distinction between two rhetorical devices: allegory and symbol, 
and show how this is central to the problem of politics and language.
The last work of D. H. Lawrence, Apocalypse (1931), is a book which crit-
icizes the Book of Revelation of St. John. Lawrence discloses that Christianity is 
transformed into a “religion of power” because of the Jewish people’s ressentiment 
?they brought about the notion of “the judgment of God” in order to justify 
their final triumph in the hereafter. During this process the ancient symbols were 
appropriated to serve their utopian vision. Lawrence considers the notion of “the 
judgment of God” as the predestined result of a system of allegorical interpreta-
tion. Allegory requires an Ur-narrative which absorbs any other narratives. As a 
result, in the Book of Revelation, the possibilities for many interpretations, which 
the ancient symbol had, were lost.
Lawrence examines the potency of the ancient symbols in detail. The ancient 
times that Lawrence mentions are in fact the pre-Socratic societies. For people 
in those days, the cosmos is always newly created each time the combination of 
its elements changes, and so are humans. We never know what we will happen to 
be. They expressed this process in symbols, so the symbols are the open-ended 
responses to the unknown. Lawrence concludes that from the perspective of the 
symbolic way of thinking, meanings are not settled only in one level.
Lawrence applies the distinction between the allegorical and the symbolic way 
of thinking to the examination of the characteristics of modern men and society. 
Allegory opens the door to dictatorship, while symbolic seeing is rejected as irratio-
nal. Nevertheless, he dares to encourage people to follow the latter way of thinking. 
This is because he sensed the recurrence of allegorical violence in his contemporary 
times. In this sense, this strategy of Lawrence can be identified as the politics of 
symbol, which not only opens the path to a critical analysis of power, but also urges 
us to re-examine the relation of consciousness, language and politics. 
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